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Dealing with Deficits and
the Rise in Federal Spending

by Murray L. Weidenbaum
At a time when, alas, economist jokes are
in vogue, I would like to add my favorite
wisecrack about our profession: if all the
economists in the world were laid end to
end, it might be a good thing. This sour
remark is instigated by my having to listen
to, and occasionally participate in, what
seem to be endless debates on whether
budget deficits really matter, and, if so, on
what arcane basis of measurement. I finally
have found a short cut that reconciles the
great intellectual wisdom of our profession
with the practical concerns of participants
in and observers of financial markets. Thus,
I conclude that deficits do not matter-but
that Treasury borrowing and money creation
surely do!
Having disposed of this weighty subject
so quickly, let me go on to examine several
current policy questions relating to federal
finance and to budget deficits. First, let us
consider the nature of the changes made in
federal outlays by the Reagan Administration
and, second, let us analyze some of the
economic implications, covering both military and civilian programs. This task, it
turns out, is more complicated than one
might expect.
How Much Has the Budget Been Cut?
To begin, it is difficult to directly
compare the current estimates of outlays
under the Reagan program with those
contained in President Carter's last budget
message, presented in January, 1981. Since
Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished
University Professor at Washington University in St.
Louis. An earlier version of this paper was presented
at a conference at the Center for the Study of
American Business.

then, the publications of the Office of
Management and Budget have generally
"adjusted" the Carter numbers upward for
a change that it believes President Carter
should have made-specifically providing
for what is now considered to be an
adequate national defense. That procedure
does have its advantages. That is, by
assigning the present Administration's
increases in national defense to the
numbers associated with the previous
Administration, OMB can take credit for its
cuts in civilian outlays while ignoring the
increases in military outlays.
This means in practice that, if we want to
compare Reagan with Carter, we must dig
the Carter reports out of our archives and
compare the data in them with the figures
in the most current Reagan budget
publications. I will note in passing that this
is a chore that the average journalist
working under a tight deadline may forego.
In any event, I find such statistical
explorations useful for those engaged in
more leisurely scholarly pursuits.

OMB takes credit for cuts
in civilian outlays, while
ignoring military outlay increases
Table 1 contains a first effort to make
such a comparison. It compares total
outlays for fiscal years 1982-1986 as
estimated in the last Carter Budget report
with those shown in the most recent
Reagan Administration budget report. It is
clear that the Reagan spending totals in
current dollars (unadjusted for progress on
inflation) are lower in each year than the
Carter figures. The current Administration's
much slower growth in civilian spending
more than offsets its increases in defense
outlays, but by about one half of the 1981
tax cuts-about $350 billion versus over
$700 billion for the five year period 1982-86.
More sophisticated comparisons can be
made. For example, the comparison can be
2
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restated in terms of constant dollars, using
in each case the inflation assumptions that
accompanied the respective current dollar
estimates. The results based on the GNP
deflators are contained in Table 2. The
differences between the two sets of
projected outlays are very much smaller
than in Table 1, about $23 billion when
viewed in real (deflated) terms over the
period 1982-86 (or a little less than $5
billion a year).
A variation of this theme is contained in
Table 3, where the CPI assumptions are
used to adjust both sets of outlay
projections. In this case, the results are
more ambiguous. Using the CPI as a
deflator, the aggregate estimates for fiscal
years 1982-1986 under the Reagan programs
are shown on balance to be a bit higher
than the Carter estimates-by about $7
billion (or a little over $1 billion a year).

In relation to the 1981 tax cuts, net
spending reductions have been modest
It does seem clear that, especially in
relation to the 1981 tax cuts, the net
spending reductions in the past 20 months
are modest. It is not surprising, therefore,
that current projections of the budget
deficit for the next several years are
unusually high. See Table 4 for estimates
by the Congressional Budget Office that are
in the neighborhood of $150 billion a year.
Unofficial forecasts of the deficit in the
next few years range up to $200 billion
annually.

The Problem of Entitlements
When we probe beneath the aggregate
spending levels, we find that "entitlements"
or payments to individuals constitute the
largest category of the budget. In recent
years, entitlement payments also have been
the most rapidly growing budget category.
It therefore is quite appropriate that
4

TABLE 2
Reagan and Carter Budget Estimates
(Billions of Constant 1972 Dollars,

Using GNP Deflators in Respective Documents)
Fiscal Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Amount
Carter
Reagan
$345.0
351.7
355.4
361.2
368.8

Difference
$ +9.9
-4.6
-7.7
-8.2
-12.7

$354.9
347.1
347.7
353.0
356.1

TABLE 3
Reagan and Carter Budget Estimates

(Billions of Constant Dollars,
Using CPI Deflators in Respective Documents)
Fiscal Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Amount
Carter
Reagan
$241.0
245.0
247.6
251.7
257.0

Difference

$253.5
247.4
247.0
250.0
251.5

$+ 12.5
+2.4
-0.6
-1.7
-5.5

TABLE 4
Projections of the Federal Budget
(Fiscal Years, Billions of Dollars)
1982

1983

OMB

CBO

OMB

CBO

Outlays
$731
Revenues 622
Deficit
109

$733
621

$762
647

$788
633

liT

liS 15.5

OMB

CBO

OMB

CBO

Outlays
$812
Revenues 720
Deficit

$844
692

$875
801

$910
757

1984

-w

1985

~

---.s2
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increasing attention is being given to this
area. I have little to add to the extensive
public debate. I am, however, struck by the
vast amount of ignorance attached to the
largest entitlement, social security benefit
payments.
Given the current focus on reducing those
outsized budget deficits, any discussion of
possible change in social security outlays is
immediately attacked as an effort to
balance the budget on the backs of social
security pensioners. It is true that facing
the problem of social security financing
would likely result in smaller budget
deficits. But-and this fundamental point is
usually ignored-even if the federal budget
were in such great shape that we could
declare dividends out of the surplus, we
would still have to face the basic problem
that the social security system is not
adequately financed.

We must face the basic problem
that the Social Security system
is not adequately financed
Over the years, Congress has been more
aggressive in voting benefit increases than
in enacting the social security tax increases
to pay for them. Also, demographic and
economic trends have turned out in recent
years to be more adverse than assumed in
the system's actuarial calculations. Thus, the
public debate on social security has the
issue backwards: our attention is needed on
the question of social security finance, not
because of the budget deficits but to ensure
that the program fully meets the disbursements to which it is committed. We must
recognize, however, that although it is the
largest single "entitlement program," social
security is only one of many. A comprehensive budget restraint effort must take a
hard look at the other components in this
category, including veterans' pensions and
government employees' retirement benefits.

6

The Question of National Defense Spending
Let us turn to the second largest category
of budget outlays, national defense. Here
we should acknowledge at the outset that
there is a broad-based agreement on the
need to expand U.S. national defense
spending. Both the Carter and Reagan
budgets projected significant growth in
defense spending in real terms for each of
the five fiscal years 1982-1986. The Council
of Economic Advisers (CEA) stated in its
annual report accompanying the President's
1982 Economic Report, "any economic
effects ... must be assessed in the context of
the overriding need for maintaining the
level of defense spending necessary for
national security."
As would be expected, there has been
considerable disagreement over the
specifics of the buildup, including the
question of how rapid an expansion in
military spending is desirable. But it should
be recognized that none of this is a debate
between hawks and doves. Among the
specific questions raised is the economic
feasibility of the currently contemplated
schedule of military outlays. Moreover, the

The defense buildup is not a "hawk vs. dove"
issue so much as it is a question of
economic feasibility
1981-82 recession has resulted in such
substantial amounts of excess capacity in
American industry that, at least for the next
year or two, there is likely to be adequate
capacity to meet military and civilian
needs. But it is useful to look beyond, to
the middle of the decade, when significant
economic growth may coincide with the
peak of the military buildup. In such
circumstances, capacity questions would
arise. The CEA annual report deals with
that eventuality, pointing out three results
of the defense buildup that can be
anticipated:
7

1. The substantial transfer of resources
in the durable goods sector to defense
production may increase relative prices
in some of the affected industries.
Both the Department of Defense and
private purchasers may have to pay
more for goods from these industries.
This premium is likely to increase with
the size of the defense budget.
2. Increased demand may produce delays
in the delivery of military goods.
Delivery timetables that seem realistic
today may become obsolete as
producers try to accommodate both
the defense buildup and the expansion
in civilian investment.
3. Some crowding out of private
investment may occur. Defense
procurement uses many of the same
physical resources needed for private
investment, and the Defense Production
Act gives defense priority in the
market place. Some private firms may
turn to foreign sources, while others
may cancel or postpone plans for
expansion.
When we examine the details of the
military budget, we find that the
concentration of the planned military
increases within procurement and research
and development implies weapon
production growth rates more rapid than
those which occurred at the peak of the
Vietnam buildup. Moreover, the present
expansion occurs after a decade of steady
reductions in the defense industrial base.
A private economic consulting
organization, Data Resources, Inc. (DRI),
pointed out:
... the combination of the increasing
defense shares and the acceleration
in growth rates raises concerns
about industrial capabilities and
spillover impacts on the economy. 1
DRI goes on to note that, with the
implementation of significant investment

8

programs in both plant and equipment and
skilled labor forces, the problems of price
pressures, bottlenecks and crowding out of
civilian demand "could be constrained to
isolated instances." See Table 5 for some
examples of extremely rapid growth rates
in future defense industry requirements.
Over the six-year period 1982-87, doubledigit increases in annual output are shown
for many industries, ranging from
semiconductors to computers. The DRI
conclusion is that the uncertainties about
the capabilities of the defense industrial
base and its linkages to other critical
economic variables "will continue to cloud
decisions regarding the defense budget."
A more recent Data Resources report is
even less sanguine, pointing out that, since
1948, there has never before been a period
of sustained growth in real defense
spending such as that now planned. This
more recent study concludes that the
projected requirements for such large
increases in defense output raise "obvious"
questions about the ability of industry to
meet them without adverse implications in
terms of costs and leadtimes. 2 A variation
of that theme appears in a recently released
study by the U.S. Department of Commerce
which reminds us that defense expenditures
do not affect all industries equally, but
have "highly concentrated industrial
impacts." 3

)

l

Defense expenditures do not affect all
industries equally; they have "highly
concentrated industrial impacts"
The Commerce Department examined a
somewhat different time period than did
DRI, but the conclusions are fairly similar.
For most of the 58 major defense supplying
industries which it studied, the Department
of Commerce reported that existing capacity plus planned increases are sufficient to
supply the projected military and civilian

9

TABLE 5
Projected Increases in Output in Major
Defense Supplying Industries, 1982-1987
Average annual real percentage growth
in projected output

Industry
Radio & TV communication
equipment
Aircraft
Aircraft engines & parts
Aircraft parts & equip., n.e.c.
Complete guided missiles
Electronic components, n.e.c.
Tanks & components
Ammunition, excluding
small arms, n.e.c
Motor vehicles parts
and accessories
Motor vehicles
Other ordnance, accessories
Communications, excluding
radio and TV
Semiconductors
Miscellaneous machinery
Electronic computing
equipment
Aluminum rolling & drawing
Miscellaneous plastic
products
Primary aluminum
Plastic materials & resins
Special dies, tools & ace.
Telephone & telegraph equip.
Metal stampings
Industrial trucks & tractors
Machine tools, metal
cutting
Iron and steel foundries

Annual Increases
In Total In Defense
Output,
Output,
1982-87
1982-87
11.2%
12.8
13.0
11.2
11.5
11.2
22.6

15.7%
18.6
16.3
14.7
15.2
17.2
27.1

15.0

15.2

6.3
6.7
13.5

20.5
27.8
14.4

6.9
13.7
6.9

10.3
20.2
15.3

12.6
7.9

16.8
17.9

8.5
7.3
8.8
8.2
11.5
7.0
9.9

17.3
17.1
17.8
15.8
16.4
18.6
14.1

9.2
4.3

15.7
13.2

from 1979 to 1985, but economically efficient capacity is estimated to decline by 4
percent. Likewise, requirements for brass,
bronze, and copper foundries are shown to
increase by 32 percent, but economically efficient capacity is expected to rise by 25
percent (see Table 6). How will all this
balance out?
The Commerce study reported that some
of our basic metal processing industries
will likely need to increase their dependence
on foreign sources of supply in order to
meet the stepped-up military demands. For
example, the electrometallurgical products
industry (which was specifically noted
because of its "qualitative importance to

Meeting 1985 defense requirements
could mean using outmoded,
inefficient capacity-thus increasing
costs and prices

demands through 1985. However, the Department said that, should further capacity
expansion not take place in some of these
industries, meeting projected 1985 requirements would mean using outmoded,
economically inefficient capacity, which
would increase costs and prices. For example, requirements for lead smelting and refining are projected to rise by 12 percent

defense") met 27.6 percent of its needs with
imports in 1979. That key industry is expected to increase that dependency to 45
percent in 1985. Likewise, zinc smelting and
refining is anticipated to increase its import
dependency from 33.4 percent in 1979 to 45
percent in 1985. Imports of miscellaneous
refined nonferrous metals are estimated to
comprise 66 percent of the industry in 1985,
compared to 55.7 percent in 1979 (see Table
7). It is ironic to note the matter-of-fact way
in which the Commerce Department reports
such increased foreign dependence for some
of the key defense-producing industries. On
many other occasions, the hoary national
security argument is trotted out to justify a
host of subsidies to sectors of the economy
far less closely related to defense output.
The point of these data should not be misunderstood. Drawing attention to the
economic impacts of the contemplated expansion of military outlays does not call in
question the desirablity of the expansion
but, rather, its feasibility and cost in the

10
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Source: Compiled from Data Resources, Inc.
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TABLE 7
Changing Import Dependence of Selected
Defense Industries
Imports as Percent
of Total Supply
Industry
1979
1985 est.
Iron and ferroalloy
ores mining
25.0
28.1
Small arms
10.6
9.4
Blast furnaces and
steel mills
10.1
13.0
Electrometallurgical
products
27.6
45.0
Lead smelting
and refining
8.8
11.0
Zinc smelting
and refining
33.4
45.0
Aluminum production
and refining
8.9
10.0
Refining of nonferrous
metals, n.e.c.
55.7
66.0
Machine tools,
metal-cutting types
17.2
23.0
Machine tools,
metal-forming types
9.2
13.6
Ball and roller
bearings
10.5
14.0
Instruments to measure
electricity
8.9
13.0
Semiconductors and
related devices
20.6
30.0
Electronic components,
n.e.c.
8.0
11.5
Optical instruments
and lenses
14.1
19.5
Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Industrial
Economics

period contemplated. An implicit assumption
arises from these concerns: any adjustment
of scheduled defense outlays to conform
more closely with expected domestic production capabilities would result in slowing
down the rate of increase in defense spending in the next few years and thus lower the
projected deficits of the federal government.

Adjusting defense outlays in the next
few years to conform with production
capacity would lower the federal
government's projected deficits

12
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Conclusions

In responding to the concerns over the continuing large federal deficits projected for
the next several years, I have emphasized the
desirability of another hard look at the
spending side of the budget. Unlike another
round of tax increases, restraining government expenditures is entirely consistent
with the efforts of President Reagan to
strengthen the private sector by reducing
the size of government.
Three major areas of the budget appear
to be promising candidates for further
pruning of outlays-above and beyond the
Administration's important efforts to ferret
out low priority items and to curb waste:
1. The so-called entitlements. These openended commitments on the budget
range from social security and medicare to medicaid, welfare, veterans'
pensions, and the retirement systems
for federal employees, military and
civilian. In the short run, reductions
could be made in the generous formulas for computing annual cost-ofliving increases (the COLA clauses)
contained in many of these programs.
More fundamental changes probably
will not be made until the public
recognizes the extent to which these
"social insurance" programs have
taken on a subsidy or welfare
aspect-e.g., providing benefits far
more generous than those that would
result from basing the payments solely
on employee/employer contributions
plus earnings on those contributions.
Making benefits subject to income
taxes-as is now done with private
retirement benefits-would reduce the
net subsidy payment, especially to
those taxpayers with substantial
amounts of other income.
2. The defense budget. Official projections of future military outlays, in real

14

terms, have risen successively during
the last two years from 5% to 7% to
9% or more per annum. I find little
justification offered of the economic
feasibility of this sharply upward
movement. A tough-minded attitude
should be taken to the military budget,
comparable to the treatment of many
civilian spending activities of the
federal government. Reducing the extent of cost overruns and bottlenecks

A tough-minded attitude should be
taken to the military budget,
comparable to the treatment of many
civilian spending activities
in defense production will help to
maintain the necessary support for the
strengthened national defense that is
needed in the dangerous world in
which we live.
Because of the potential capacity
problems, a given cutback in nominal
military spending would actually
result in less than a proportional reduction in real procurement outlays.
This would come about because of reduced price pressures on military purchasing generally.
3. Imbedded subsidies. Advocates of
smaller federal budgets typically focus
on entitlements and/or defense spending because these are the two largest
categories. However, it does not take a
great deal of research to discover a
third category of the budget, "all
other." Contrary to widespread belief,
not all of the i terns in this part of the
budget are social programs, nor have
they been cut to the bone. Generous
programs such as subsidies to dairy
and tobacco farmers and sugar producers quickly come to mind. There is
no serious justification for these subsidies and many others like them in
15

other departments of the federal government. Such special benefits to specific segments of the society are in the
budget simply because of the political
muscle of the producer or other special interest groups supporting them.
The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared several comprehensive
listings of potential budget cuts that
could be made. There is no shortage of
information. All that is lacking is the
will to cut more.
On reflection, we need to realize that at
times-such as earlier this year-the failure
to curtail federal spending leads to pressures for tax increases. Given the outlook
for rising deficit financing, if we are to
avoid further reversals of the 1981 tax cuts,
more of the existing sacred cows in the
federal budget should be taken out of pasture and led to slaughter.

More of the existing sacred cows
in the federal budget
should be taken out of pasture
and led to slaughter
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